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Pressure to Democratize? An Assessment of U.S. Policy Towards Post-Arab Spring
Egypt
Emilie Meguid

“But for the Arab Spring countries, we knew there were going to be challenges. We
knew that the road was going to be rocky here. As I’ve repeatedly said, our own
democratic transition in the U.S., building this democracy, was challenging. And we
knew also that this would take time. This is a generational shift.”
-Marie Harf, U.S. Department of State Spokesperson
October 10th 2013
“President Mubarak has made public commitments to undertake a process of reform and
change, and we are just encouraging him, ‘You have no time to waste.’”
-Philip J. Crowley, U.S. Department of State Spokesperson
February 3rd, 2011
INTRODUCTION
In January of 2011, on the eve of the Arab Spring’s manifestation in Egypt, Hosni
Mubarak was a symbol of the legacy established on July 23rd 1952 by Gamal Abdel
Nasser and Mohammad Naguib, the charismatic military leaders who led the Free
Officers Movement in a coup d’état against King Farouk. Their actions caused the
dissolution of Egypt’s multiparty parliament, the ultimate abolition of its constitutional
monarchy, and set the stage for military domination of Egyptian politics over the next
sixty years, until Mubarak’s abrupt ouster. His fall was the harbinger of a new era in
Egyptian politics, which brought with it an unprecedented amount of political insecurity.
Would this new age lead to a long-awaited Egyptian democracy? What role would the
United States play in Egypt’s evolution?
Hosni Mubarak’s rule was characterized by thirty years of emergency law that
empowered the abuse of civil liberties. In 2010, during his final year at office and at
Egypt’s most liberal state since 1952, Egypt was ranked by the Polity Project as a -31, a
“closed anocracy”, which they define as “mixed, or incoherent, authority regimes”
(Marshall & Gurr, n.d.). According to Polity, Egypt in 2010 was “best understood as a
1

On a scale from 10 (consolidated democracy), to -10 (hereditary monarchy), by the Polity IV
project, which codes the authority characteristics of states based on conceptions of polity
deriving from Eckstein and Gurr’s 1975, Patterns of Authority: A Structural Basis for
Political Inquiry.
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bureaucratically entrenched one-party state…[that is plagued by] flagrant abuses of
human rights and manifest conflict between factions –the NDP led government and its
supporters and the Islamic fundamentalists” (Polity IV, 2010).
The factors outlined in the Polity assessment, and the corruption of the Egyptian
state, were so profound that on January 25th 2011, after watching the protests of their
neighbors in Tunisia, tens of thousands of previously-silent Egyptians poured into Tahrir
square to denounce the abuses they had experienced at the hands of Mubarak’s regime,
and call for a transition to democracy. The international community cheered its support
for the Egyptian citizenry, and by June 30th 2012, Egypt had held its first-ever legitimate
presidential elections, won by President Mohamed Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood’s
political arm, the Freedom and Justice party.
Egypt’s prospects for democracy were initially high. Its first-ever democratically
elected president ended the period of military rule that had been firmly entrenched since
the 1952 coup, and was vocal in his support of the promotion of human rights, and
supportive of constitutional changes. Freedom House, a U.S.-based, non-governmental
organization that assesses countries’ degrees of freedom, even changed Egypt’s
classification from “not-free” to “partly free” by 2013. But the optimistic narrative started
declining by late 2012. Morsi began to alienate Egyptians with actions like his
declaration of judicial immunity in November 2012, and by the spring of 2013, Egypt’s
Tamarod movement began collecting signatures in a campaign that demanded the
withdrawal of confidence in Morsi’s government, and the hosting of early elections. On
June 30th, the anniversary of Morsi’s inauguration, protests reached their climax as
millions joined together in a call for his removal. By the 7th of July 2013, Morsi was
ousted by military intervention, and Egypt began its democratic descent. Adli Mansour,
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the head of the Supreme Constitutional Court, took on the role of interim president with
promises of increased political dialogue.
Despite what Mansour may have vowed in his constitutional declarations, Egypt
saw a significant tightening of civil liberties since his inauguration. Outlets for political
expression were stamped down upon, and Freedom House’s assessment of Egypt dropped
from their 2013 ranking as “partly free”, to “not free” in early 2014, yet Egypt is
currently speeding towards presidential2 and parliamentary elections in the midst of this
democratically compromised environment. The inherent contrast between these two
realities, of Egypt heading towards elections born of a non-democratic environment,
leads to several questions, one of which being how does the United States, a longtime
Egyptian ally, feel about the events that have transpired in Egypt since Mubarak’s fall?
Egypt is a strategic ally to the United States due both to its geographic location,
and to the 1979 Peace Treaty it signed with Israel, which resulted in the U.S. providing
Egypt with roughly $1.55 billion dollars of annual aid. In its current state, Egypt presents
a dilemma to U.S. foreign policy best described by Jeremy Sharp of the Congressional
Research Service, as the need to find balance between “the sometimes-contradictory
goals of enhancing U.S. national and global security and promoting democracy” (Sharp,
2013). At the outset, the United States appears to be a stauch supporter of Egyptian
democratization. As will be later demonstrated, it applies more rhetorical and monetary
pressure on Egypt to democratize quickly than it does on any other post-Arab Spring
country, an insistance which could be initially interpreted as enthusiasm for Egyptian
success. The United States also now conditions its aid to Egypt based on democratic
progress. Yet, when swift democratization isn’t practical and can deter the ability of
2

Currently the presidential elections are set to be held sometime in July, before the
parliamentary elections, the dates of which have yet to be announced.
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poltical groups to rally, when rhetorical pressure for speed is still applied during
situations where Egypt would be better suited to bolster civil liberties, and when the bar
for aid conditionalities is set so low it could be walked over, it appears that the United
States is more interested in the appeasement of Egyptian civilians with the façade of a
democracy, than it is in using what leverage it might have to push for a truly liberalized
democracy in Egypt. With al-Sisi gearing to run for president, bolstered by much popular
support, and the U.S.’ apparent reluctance to take concrete steps towards liberalized
democracy promotion in Egypt, it seems ever more likely that, for now, Egypt will fall
firmly back to its pre-revolution days, back into the tradition of military-dominated
politics that took root with the actions of the Free Officers in 1952.

LITERATURE REVIEW
The democratization literature is broad and oftentimes conflicting in its
assessments. Ultimately, what could be said of it is that there is no master template for
successful democratization; the same could be said of a subset of this literature,
democracy promotion. Considering the nature and longevity of U.S.-Egypt relations, it
was inevitable that the United States would become entangled in Egypt’s democratization
process, which leads to the questions, what influence, if any, does the United States have
over Egyptian internal affairs? Also, what are the United States’ goals for their
involvement in the Egyptian democratization process? A look into the democratization
literature will shed light on these inquiries.
One of the most significant recent changes in the democratization literature is the
shift away from the transitions paradigm, as is outlined in Thomas Carothers' aptly
named, The End of the Transition Paradigm. Previously, the literature held the notion
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that post-authoritarian states should be viewed as “in transition”. O’Donnell and
Schmitter, hugely influential authors in the literature, for instance, describe transitions as
the “interval between one political regime and another”, and state that the “other” could
mean anything from the “instauration of a political democracy”, the restoration of a new
authoritarian rule, “rotation in power of successive governments which fail to provide
any enduring or predictable solution to the problem of institutionalizing political power”,
or widespread, confrontations that result in revolutionary regimes (O'Donnell &
Schmitter, 1986).
Carothers states that the issue with this “transition paradigm” that was so widely
accepted within the democracy-promoting community, is that it lends itself to several
assumptions that could potentially hinder democratic progress, such as the notion that
“countries moving away from authoritarianism tend to follow a three-part process of
democratization consisting of opening, breaking and consolidating”, that each country is
indeed moving towards democracy, that the establishment of elections will grant
democratic legitimacy and a deepening of democratic principles, or that state building is a
secondary challenge to democracy building.
According to Carothers, a “whole generation of democracy aid is based on the
transition paradigm, above all the typical emphasis on an institutional ‘checklist’ as a
basis for creating programs, and the creation of nearly standard portfolios of aid projects
consisting of the same diffuse set of efforts all over”. He states that this methodology is
not sufficient, that democracy aid “must proceed from a penetrating analysis of the
particular core syndrome that defines political life of the country in question”, and that
providers of democracy aid must develop a broader conception of democracy that bridges
“the longstanding divide between aid programs directed at democracy-building and those
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focused on social and economic development” (Carothers, 2002). Carothers later notes in
his 2004, Critical Mission: Essays on Democracy Promotion, that civil society doesn’t
necessarily go hand in hand with either democratic or economic progress, but states that,
ultimately, “civil society and the state need each other, and, in the best of worlds, they
develop in tandem, not at eachother’s expense” (Carothers, 2004).
With time the democratization literature has shifted from its fixation on a standard
“transition” state, with set checklists for democratic progress, to focus on individual
countries’ needs, and combining the development of civil liberties and democratization;
an important shift, even if countries like the United States, whose democratic assistance
has been described as “…partial, ill thought-out, and inadequate” (Carothers, 2004), still
bases there approach on the “‘normal’ sequence of change and the practice of
‘institutional modeling’” (Burnell, 2005). This shift is so significant because
democratization can occur without liberalization (Burnell, 2005; Diamond, 1996;
O'Donnell & Schmitter, 1986), and can result in a state Burnell (2005) labels as a
“democratization backwards”, where elections may be the deciding factor in who will
govern, but no “substantial progress” is made in respect to the rule of law, or towards a
situation where individual and group liberties are “firmly entrenched”.
A state such as Burnell describes, where the country could be labeled as a semi
democracy, is problematic as they are the most likely candidates for internal repression,
as demonstrated by Regan and Henderson in their Democracy, Threats and Political
Repression in Developing Countries: Are Democracies Internally Less Violent, and the
“most susceptible to violent internal conflict”, as Hegre et al (2001), and Mousseau
(2001) indicated. Burnell (2005) notes these trends, and also warns that these regimes
have a tendency to acquire a “degree of permanence”. In his words, “A strategy for
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support that only weakens authoritarianism, or promotes democratic opening, but
disengages at the point where an illiberal democracy becomes entrenched, would be
reprehensible”. Not only are civil liberties constrained in these situations, but, as Linz and
Stephan note, many elections that are held under these circumstances are not conducive
to a complete democratic transition because “…the government resulting from elections
like these lacks the de jure and de facto power to determine policy in many significant
areas because the executive, legislative, and judicial powers are still decisively
constrained by an interlocking set of ‘reserve domains’, military ‘prerogatives’, or
‘authoritarian enclaves’” (Linz & Stephan, 1996). In other words, not only is it
necessary to focus on civil liberties for their own merit, but elections held in nondemocratic environments can lead to a new, potentially permanent, decidedly
undemocratic government, characterized by constricted civil liberties and a propensity for
violence.
The literature is moving away from the “transitions paradigm”, by placing more
focus on the development of civil liberties, which Ottaway argues is valuable because
“most studies argue that reconstruction of post-conflict societies can only be successful if
reforms are carried out simultaneously in all areas – at the level of state institutions and
civil society, in the political, social, and economic realm” (Ottaway, 2003). Also, Burnell
(2005); Diamond, (1994); Levitsky & Way (2002); Linz & Stephan (1996); Moon,
(2005), all state that firmly established civil liberties are necessary to a truly consolidated,
liberal democracy.
Though the democratization literature has shifted away from the “transition
paradigm” and emphasized the importance of civil liberties, the United States’ approach
to democratization support is still mired in that traditional setting, which brings about the
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question: how much can external democracy promotion influence the Egyptian
democratization process?
While the evidence that regions can experience a “neighborhood” effect (Burnell,
2005; Doorenspleet, 2004) demonstrates countries’ potential to mimic the internal
political change in countries geographically proximate to them, the question of whether
fully-democratized and geographically-detached international forces have political
influence over foreign democratic transitions leaves more room for debate. Some in the
literature have argued that international forces have very little sway over such affairs, but
Levitsky and Way state that it’s a matter of “linkage and leverage”.
A popular defense against the effectiveness of international actors’ efforts to
support foreign democratization is to look at the 1990s, the height of western leverage
over electoral authoritarian regimes, and note that it was rarely effective in bringing about
successful democratic transitions. Levitsky and Way acknowledge this fact in their
International Linkage and Democratization, but also note that during this time period,
international “actors focused mainly on elections, often neglecting such essential
components of democracy as civil liberties and a level political playing field. Countries
often slipped out of the Western spotlight once elections had been held, even when
elections failed to bring a democracy”. In other words, Western pressure was often
neither consistent nor comprehensive. The West was more focused on producing an
election than it was on deterring abuses of power or bolstering civil society. Where it
could have been effective, the West’s leverage was often used improperly.
Acknowledging this reality contributes to the explanation of why Western influences
were very infrequently the cause of successful foreign democratization during the 1990s
(Levitsky & Way, 2005).

8

But, Levitsky and Way still argue that Western leverage may play a significant
role in the bringing about of successful democratization when combined with countries
that have “extensive linkage to the West”. Their definition of linkage being “the density
of ties to the United States, the European Union, and Western-dominated multilateral
institutions” through some of five different avenues for linkage: economics, geopolitics,
societal, communication, and transnational civil societies (e.g. international NGOs,
churches). They argue that the more linkages a country has to the West, the greater the
cost of authoritarian actions within it, due to the increased likelihood that the West
would, among other things, learn of and react to government abuses. They go so far as to
state that, “Where linkage is extensive, international influences may be decisive,
contributing to democratization even in countries with highly unfavorable domestic
conditions”. Though they do admit that leverage can be limited in countries where
Western governments have important security or economic interests, and that, in these
countries “Western powers are less likely to maintain a consensus behind demands for
political reform, thereby limiting the effectiveness of those demands” (Levitsky & Way,
2005).
Levitsky and Way are not alone in their opinion on the effectiveness of
international influence. Before the events of the Arab Spring, Carothers argued that
democratization in the Middle East necessitated “a greater level of interventionism”, and
a stronger approach to the use of leveraging. He also stated that the concept of
“diplomatic pressure” is a “potentially critical element of pro-democratic policy”
(Carothers, 2004). Burnell agrees with that diplomatic pressure holds potential for
successful democracy promotion and defines it as a mix of “actions as well as words
(‘quiet diplomacy’)—ranging from inducements (irresistible or otherwise) and incentives
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(‘positive conditionalities’) to binding contracts and ‘negative conditionalities’
(deterrents and punishments) and other devices” (Burnell, 2005). He states that
international pressure on anti-reform elements allows pro-reform elements to grow. The
general consensus in the literature seems to be that well-placed international leverage,
which can take the form of rhetoric, incentives, and conditionalities, can be a positive
influence on foreign democratization. Since the United States’ policy towards Egypt
consists mainly of conditionalities and rhetorical pressure for speed, it is worth exploring
what scholars have said on the effects of conditionalities on democratization.
There are some that have argued against using conditionalities as leverage for
foreign democratization. White and Morrissey, for example, stated that, “…if
governments are willing to undertake reforms then conditionality is unnecessary and may
even be damaging (White & Morrissey, 1997), and in 1998, the World Bank stated a case
against conditionality in its Assessing Aid. What Works, What Doesn’t and Why (World
Bank, 1998). But, as Oliver Morrissey later stated in his revised opinion of
conditionalities, a previous weakness in the literature was that there were “few rigorous
comparable studies that analyze the chain from aid conditions to policies implemented to
outcomes observed, allowing for non-aid related factors” (Morrissey, 2004). Diane
Ethier’s work does its part to fill in the gap pointed out by Morrissey. In it, she
demonstrated that countries that reformed due to European Union pre-accession
conditions, and were subjected to methodical checks to affirm that pre-requisites had
been met, have made substantial progress since 1998, while the changes in countries that
have been the recipients of democratic aid programs (a form of incentives), have made
little to no democratic progress since 1994 (Ethier, 2003).
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A growing number of authors are agreeing that conditionalities, when applied
appropriately, are an effective method for promoting democracy (Burnell, 1994; Ethier,
2003; Levitsky & Way, 2005; Morrissey, 2004), which begs the question why
conditionalities have occasionally earned a bad name. Gordon Crawford’s, Foreign aid
and political conditionality: Issues of effectiveness and consistency explored the
implementation and effects of political conditionalities made by four aid donors in the
1990s. What he found was that it was the donor’s intent that posed real obstacles to
political goal achievement, that the ineffectiveness of the aid restrictions in promoting
change was due to the “weakness of measures imposed”, which put into question the
“seriousness of donor intent”. Crawford further notes that the application of many of the
policies was “selective and inconsistent”, and that the “continued subordination of human
rights and democracy to other foreign policy concerns… not only undermines public
credibility and legitimacy, but also limits impact and effectiveness” (Crawford, 1997).
Based on the existing literature it seems safe to assume that conditionalities, when
applied in an appropriate manner, with sufficient donor intent, and consistent application
of restrictions, like the process Ethier observed in European Union accession, are an
effective measure of democracy promotion.
The final piece to understanding the effect of United States democracy promotion
in Egypt is the notion of timing. As will be demonstrated later in this paper, the United
States has applied more rhetorical and conditional pressure on Egypt to democratize than
it has on any other post-Arab Spring country. At first glance, this pressure could be
interpreted as an enthusiasm for Egyptian democratization, but the literature seems to
indicate otherwise. The democratization literature is often divided. One of the most
significant splits is between actor and structure-oriented approaches to democratization,
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yet, for their own reasons, both approaches believe that democratization is an inherently
slow process.
Structure-based explorations of democratization believe that democratization
progresses slowly because, as Moon observes, it “requires complex, multi-faceted,
evolution in the political, social, and economic realms” (Moon, 2005). Structural
explanations base democratic success on fundamental changes in a country’s makeup,
like the deterioration of class inequality and economic progress, all changes that take
place after long periods of reform (Doorenspleet, 2004; Lipset, 1994; Przeworski &
Limongi, 1997). Actor-oriented democratization explanations place more stock in the
behaviors of the elite members of a society than its structure. They view democratization
as a staged process that takes no less time than what structure-oriented explanations
forecast (Kitschelt, 1992; O'Donnell & Schmitter, 1986). Despite their differences, both
Structure and Actor-oriented explanations state that, in order for democratization to be
successful, deep structural and societal changes must be made. All in all, “Democratic
consolidations must take time because the conditions necessary for it are themselves the
outcomes of protracted processes” (Linz & Stephan, 1996). Rapid democratization, as
Moon states, is rare. But how rare, and what constitutes “rapid”?

In Can Iraq democratize? How long will it take? Moon provides a table (Table
1) that outlines the percentage of states that successfully transferred from various levels
of autocracy/democracy to a coherent democracy (based on their Polity IV rankings)
within certain timeframes.
Table 1: Percentage of nations that achieve coherent democracy after
various lags
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Extreme autocracy (-9/-10)
Other coherent autocracy (-7/-8)
Incoherent polity (+6 to -6)
Coherent democracy (+7 to +10)

5 years
1.02
3.96
6.72
90.45

10 years
2.88
7.17
11.09
86.92

20 years
7.21
13.12
15.22
86.09

Polity’s most recent review places Egypt within the “incoherent polity” ranking. When
comparing Egypt to states within its ranking, it seems that the it would not be foolish to
estimate that the likelihood of it transferring to a coherent democracy within the next five
years is roughly 6.72%, and within the next 20 years is only marginally better, with a
potential success rate of about 15.22%.
The consensus seems to be that a rapid Egyptian transition to democracy may not
be advisable, or even possible, especially given its current climate and when concerns are
being voiced over the transition’s current pace, like Martini’s, who states that “Although
the generals rightly claim that the sooner elections are held, the sooner they can return to
their barracks, the compressed time table is making it hard for new political forces to get
off the ground” (Martini & Taylor, 2011). Moving too quickly through their democratic
transition can cause Egypt to compromise the foundation off of which their future
political system will be built.
One overarching theme the reader should keep in mind henceforth is Robert Art’s
characterization of America’s primary national interests with regards to its foreign policy.
The highest priority of the United States when dealing with other countries is the
“defense of the homeland”, while its fifth interest is the “consolidation of democracy and
spread and observance of human rights” (Art, 2013). Egypt provides a unique case where
these two interests directly conflict. The author will argue that it is due to this clash,
between the United States’ desire for security in the Arab region, which it equates with
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national security, and their reputation as a champion of democracy, that causes the United
States’ calls for a quick democratic transition in Egypt. American leaders cannot risk
being unsupportive of democracy while their reputation as its great defender is on the
line, but national security holds much more weight on foreign decision making, therefore
the United States compromises by encouraging Egypt to go through their democratic
motions, but quickly, so the focus can return to issues essential to U.S. national security.
A review of the literature seems to indicate that, while international players,
especially those with a considerable amount of linkages to the country in question, can
indeed play a significant role in the democratization process of other countries with the
use of conditionalities that are sufficiently challenging, appropriate to the situation, and
strongly enforced, external players should not push for the democratization process to
move too quickly. They should, instead, maintain their support throughout the postauthoritarian or democratic transition, “valley of tears” (Dahrendorf, 1990) and, “… be
prepared for a long haul” (Burnell, 2005). If this is the ideal model for external
democratization support, it cannot be said that the United States would fair well in an
appraisal of its democracy promotion in Egypt thus far.

RESEARCH DESIGN
In order to determine whether the United States was applying a unique amount of
rhetorical pressure on Egypt to democratize quickly, it was necessary to contrast what has
been said about Egypt’s transition with rhetoric concerning countries going through
similar processes. In doing so, any specific emphases, or atypicalities would make
themselves apparent. Libya, Tunisia, and Yemen were chosen to provide foils to the
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rhetoric released by the United States concerning Egypt’s transition to democracy. Each
country had also gone through a regime change due to the events that occurred during the
Arab Spring, and was significant enough that the United States would deign it necessary
to remark upon their domestic affairs. Since an exact mirror to Egypt’s transition does not
exist, the countries chosen for this study either demonstrated sufficient similarities to
Egypt’s transition, or provided a contrast that would shed light on the United States’
relationship with Egypt. In order to determine which countries would be chosen, a brief
review of their recent history was necessary.

The first country to experience the wave of the Arab Spring, Tunisia, was home to
Mohamed Bouazizi, whose act of self-immolation on December 17th of 2010 was said to
have sparked the Arab Spring movement. Besides being the catalyst of the revolutions,
Tunisia was chosen because of several parallels that could be draw between it and Egypt.
Former President Ben Ali fled the state on the 14th of January 2011, after almost a month
of protests, similar to Former President Mubarak, who stepped down on the 11th of
February 2011, fifteen days after protests erupted throughout Egypt, and dissimilar to
both Muammar al-Gaddafi of Libya and Ali Saleh of Yemen, former heads of countries
that had to wait a relatively long time for their removal. Further connections between
Egypt and Tunisia include the presence in Tunisia of the Tamarod movement, which
launched a petition in July of 2013 to have Tunisia’s National Assembly dissolved in a
similar fashion to the Egyptians’ Tamarod campaign, which lead to Morsi’s ouster in
2013. Also, just like Egypt’s democratic process, Tunisia’s transition continues to be a
topic of discussion in early 2014, whereas mentions of Yemen and Libya’s progress
tapered off in 2013 (See Figure 1).
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Figure 1: Mentions of Countries’ Democratic Transitions

Data from U.S. Department of State

Libya was selected to provide contrast to Egypt’s transition. The juxtaposition of
Libya and Egypt was meant to highlight the relative tameness and stability of Egypt’s
revolution. Unlike Egypt, Libya faced direct international involvement in their transition,
and a high death toll. Libya’s interim health minister stated that at least 30,000 people
were killed, and 50,000 were wounded during the six-month civil war. Conversely, Egypt
never dissolved into civil war, and Judge Omar Marawan, the secretary-general of an
official fact-checking commission in Egypt, stated that roughly 846 people had died
between January 25th 2011, and Mubarak’s ouster. The high death toll in Libya led the
United Nation’s Security Council to pass resolution 1973 on March 17th 2011, which
allowed for a no-fly zone over Libya and authorized “all necessary measures to protect
civilians” (U.N. Security Council, 2011). Libya was also home to a weakened military,
unlike Egypt’s military which has played an active role in domestic politics throughout
the transition process (Blanchard, 2012). Libya provides an example of an Egyptian
“worst case scenario”, which became an interesting contrast to have once the analysis
was complete.
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Finally, Yemen was chosen because of the security interest the United States has
in its stability, which is somewhat similar to U.S. investment in Egyptian stability, and
because of its relatively peaceful transition. The United States’ interest in Yemen is
mainly due to their cooperation against Al-Qaida in the Arab Peninsula (AQAP). The
potential for failure of a Yemeni state was brought to the attention of Congress in a
congressional report in January of 2010. The report mentions the prospect of collapse as a
potential risk to United States’ national security due to AQAP activity in Yemen, and
because of its location at the Bab al Mandab strait. As Sharp describes it,
Many Administration officials have declared that AQAP, the Yemeni-based
terrorist organization that has attempted on several occasions to attack the U.S.
homeland, is the most lethal of the Al Qaeda affiliates. In recent years, the
Administration and Congress have supported an increased U.S. commitment of
resources to counterterrorism and stabilization efforts there. Many analysts assert
that Yemen is becoming a failed state and safe haven for Al Qaeda operatives and
as such should be considered an active theater for U.S. counterterrorism
operations.
Yemen provides perspective on the United States’ rhetorical response to a national
security-strategic country going through a relatively peaceful transition. It’s the closest
one can get to a mirror of the beginnings of Egypt’s process, though their narratives have
since splintered.
Conducting a quantitative analysis on United States’ rhetoric regarding the
transition processes of these countries required a consistent corpus that was updated
regularly to obtain sufficient data for analysis. The Department of State’s daily press
briefings were chosen due to both their frequency, and the broad array of countries they
regularly address. These press briefings are daily updates on the United States’ official
stance on events that occur across the globe. The spokespeople are both well trained and
well versed in exactly what and how they are to communicate with the press. The words
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they use are chosen with deliberation, therefore each utterance is worthy of note, making
the analysis of their regular statements ideal for this study.
Each country’s name was searched for in every press briefing since the beginning
of protests in their country3, until the end of January 2014. Each day presented three
possibilities for coding. If the country’s democratic transition was not mentioned, or if it
was only mentioned briefly or in passing, the date was not noted. If the country’s
democratic transition was mentioned in such a manner where the speed of the transition
could potentially be brought up4, that briefing’s date was recorded. If speed wasn’t
ultimately mentioned, that day would be registered as a zero count. But, if speed was
mentioned in some capacity (i.e. urging the country’s transition to go faster), the exact
number of utterances of this sort was detailed.

ANALYSIS
Speed Rhetoric
Collecting information from the Department of State’s daily briefings revealed
several trends in the United States’ rhetoric. The most significant of which being that the
United States placed an undue amount of stress on the importance of a swift Egyptian
democratization. This trend revealed itself through significantly more utterances urging
for rapidity in Egypt’s process than in any of the other countries’, and through strong
responses to any delays in Egypt’s transition timeframe that were not provoked when
3

th

th

th

th

17 December 2010 in Tunisia; 25 January 2011 in Egypt; 27 January in Yemen; 15 February in Libya
4
Example of a situation where speed could have been mentioned, but was not: “But you’re not going to
have the confidence in the – of the Libyan people in this body leading that roadmap and leading Libya in
that direction if it can’t prove that it’s going to take necessary steps to get its own house in order after an
event like the killing of the defense minister. So from that point of view, the way they deal with this is
going to set the stage for future events, and our expectation is that it will be an opportunity for them and
that they need to pursue it democratically” (8/9/11)
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similar instances occurred in the other three countries. For a complete compilation of all
state department rhetoric that encourages rapid transitions in any of the four countries in
question, please see the attached appendix.
Between December 17th, 2010 and January 2014, the four countries were
mentioned on a combined total of 1009 days. Egypt was at the forefront of the country
mentions (See Figure 2) with it being referred to on 400 of those days. Between the four
countries, mentions of democratic transitions with any capacity that could lend itself to
discussion of the transition’s speed occurred a total of 278 times. Egypt compromised
about fifty five percent of those mentions by having its democratic transition discussed
on a total of 153 days (See Figure 3).
Figure 2: Days Mentioned Since Start of Arab Spring

Figure 3: Democratic Transition Mentions

Data from U.S. Department of State

Data from U.S. Department of State

Furthermore, there were 158 total individual utterances that explicitly urged for
speed in a country’s democratic transition (See Figure 4), and 115 of those utterances
were directed at Egypt (See Figure 5).
Figure 4: Number of Democratic Speed Mentions per Briefing
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Data from U.S. Department of State

In an attempt to isolate for Egypt’s high frequency of mentions, and therefore
greater amount of opportunities to potentially discuss their democratic transition, the
percentage speed utterances per mentions of country’s transition process was measured
for each country (See Figure 6). And yet, still, with this control in place, Egypt ranked the
highest, with 75.16% of its dialog concerning its democratic transition invoking some
sense of urgency. Yemen placed in a close second with 65.31% of the rhetoric applying
for a quick transition. If the author’s earlier assertion that increased desire for a speedy
transition correlates with higher U.S. national security importance, than this is most likely
due to the importance the U.S. places on Yemen due to its strategic position and the
security interests the United States has about AQAP.
One further control was to account for speakers’ vocabulary, but the distribution
seems relatively even (See Figure 7).
Figure 5: Percent of Total Speed Rhetoric

Figure 6: Speed is Mentioned in Country Remark
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Data from U.S. Department of State

Data from U.S. Department of State

Figure 7: Speaker References to Speed

Data from U.S. Department of State

Reactions to Major Events During Revolutions
Another telling factor was the United States’ immediate responses to the
beginning of protests in each country. Protest began in Egypt on the 25th of January, 2011,
and Egypt was one of the highest items of discussion in the press briefing the next day.
There was also a rapid change in the tone of the spokesperson’s comments concerning the
events taking place. On the 27th, the overall message was that Egypt should move forward
on its own accord. Specifically it was said that the United States was, “…encouraging
reform... But exactly what the government does and how they do it and on what timeline,
that is a matter for the [Egyptian] government to work with its own population.” And yet,
just four days later, during the next possible briefing, the narrative escalated slightly, with

21

two comments mentioning the timing of Egypt’s progress. One of those utterances being,
“And our private message is our public message, that the government has to respond to
the aspirations of the Egyptian people. So this will take some time to undertake, but we
do encourage Egypt to take aggressive steps as soon as possible.” Suddenly, on the 2nd of
February, the rhetoric reached its all time highest peak, with 19 mentions of the speed of
the transition. The overall message came through very clear, the United States wanted to
see the transition start immediately. The word “now” was used a total of eleven times
during the briefing, the most common phrase being a variation of “The transition has to
start now”.
This rhetoric expands past the Department of State. Both the President and the
Secretary of State communicated similar messages. On February 1st 2011, President
Obama released public remarks on the situation in Egypt from the White House’s Grand
Foyer. He observed that, “…it is not the role of any other country to determine Egypt’s
leaders. Only the Egyptian people can do that. What is clear -- and what I indicated
tonight to President Mubarak -- is my belief that an orderly transition must be
meaningful, it must be peaceful, and it must begin now.” One day after the President’s
statement, Secretary of State Hilary Clinton made a call to Egyptian Vice President
Suleiman, where she urged for a transition to begin as soon as possible. “We believe that
more needs to be done. We believe that more needs to be done faster. And that has been
our message to officials that we’ve talked to”. In less than a week the United States
shifted their language from saying Egypt should set their own pace, to Egypt needs to
begin their transition immediately. The United States’ reaction to the other three
countries’ transitions come from a much different narrative.
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It took, predictably, a while for the United States to notice the beginnings of the
Arab Spring in Tunisia. The first time after Mohamed Bouazizi’s act of self-immolation
on December 17th of 2010 that Tunisia was mentioned in the State Department briefings
was on the fourth of January, 2011. The journalist in question asked if spokesperson
Crowley had any information on the growing unrest in Tunisia, to which the speaker
appeared to be surprised that Tunisia, of all countries, had appeared during discussion at
all, and had stated that he had not had an update on the country. There had been growing
civil unrest between the 17th of December and the 4th of January, but it had not been
noted by the State Department until this journalist mentioned it.
On January 5th, the speaker communicated the United States’ desire for restraint to
be exercised by both the government and the protestors, but it was not until the 13th that
anything about political change was mentioned. Specifically the speaker said that,
“Obviously, the people of Tunisia are sending a message to the government in terms of
the need for greater economic opportunity, expansion of civil society and political rights.
And we hope that the government will respond aggressively to the concerns of its
citizens.” The reader will note that there was no mention of democratic change, just an
emphasis on the expansion of civil society and political rights in Tunisia. As O’Donnell
and Schmitter note in their Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies, this
expansion can be equated with liberalization, which can easily occur separate from
democratization. On the 12th of January, the aim for Tunisia expressed by the United
States was not, like it so often was with regards to Egypt, Libya, and Yemen, progress
towards democracy, but instead an end to the violence, or as spokesperson Crowley
stated, “…we hope that this ongoing unrest can reach a peaceful resolution”. January 13th
was the first day the term “opening up of the political process” was used, and it was not
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until the 18th of January, almost two months after the beginning of protests in Tunisia, that
democratic progress in Tunisia was first spoken of explicitly.
Demonstrations in Libya began on the 15th of February 2011, and it was on the
28th of February, 2011 that the first explicit message of U.S. support for democratic
progress was expressed. Before this utterance, the spokespeople had been very careful to
not call for Gaddafi’s removal and stated, on the 22nd of February, that “…this is
ultimately and fundamentally an issue between the Libyan Government, its leader, and
the Libyan people”, and that the United States wanted to see “universal rights respected
and we want to see the government respond to the aspirations of its people”. Similarly,
protests began in Yemen on the 10th of February, 2011, but the first explicit mention of
support for democratization was made on the 25th of May, and significant progress
towards democracy was made only after Former President Saleh was injured during an
attack on the Presidential compound on the third of June 2011 and left to Saudi Arabia to
seek medical attention.
Egypt proved to be very different from the other three states. Protests began in
Egypt on January 25th, 2011. The next day spokesperson Crowley communicated the
United State’s desire to see political reform occur in Egypt, and six days later, on the
31st, democracy was expressly mentioned, “We want to see meaningful negotiations …
[that] focus on the elements of a transition to a government … that reflects the aspirations
of the Egyptian people. These elements would include free and fair elections for the
presidency and the parliament, constitutional changes to facilitate a more open, inclusive
democratic process”. This statement was significant not only because it occurred so soon
after the start of protests, but also because it was said while Egypt’s President Mubarak
was still in Egypt and in power. The first statements supporting democracy in both
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Yemen and Tunisia occurred only after their heads of state had left the country. The
United States associated Egypt’s protests with a democratic transition faster than they had
for the other three countries, and had stated explicitly (as opposed to stating a desire for
“political reform”, or “opening of the political process”) that progress towards democracy
should be made within a week of the first protests.
Another interesting trend is the amount of time it took for the United States to call
upon foreign leaders to step down. President Obama called upon former President
Mubarak to relinquish his position as head of state on February 5th, 2011, just eleven days
after protests began and after what Human Rights Watch estimated to be, about 300
deaths (Human Rights Watch, Egypt, February 2011). Violence began in Libya on the
17th of February 2011 and by the 22nd, 233 people had already been killed, (Human
Rights Watch, Libya, 2011), and yet Obama did not call upon Gaddafi to step down until
March 3rd, 2011. A four day difference in the time it took to call for these leaders to step
down may seem insignificant, but one could argue that, under the circumstances, when
Obama had already made the call for Mubarak to step down under much less severe
circumstances, and when an average of fifty people were dying each day in Libya, four
days is a considerable difference. What’s more, President Obama never even made an
explicit call for former President Saleh of Yemen to step down. In fact, on the fourth of
April, 2011, when a journalist asked the spokesperson if the U.S. believes Saleh should
step down, the speaker Toner’s response was “ I think that’s not necessarily a decision for
us to make... the Yemeni people should determine both the scope of change and the pace
of change and when a transition, a peaceful transition of power, takes place that meets
their aspirations”. This statement was released during the same press briefing that
reiterated the need for Qadafi’s removal, so it is not as if the speaker in question was
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reluctant to make such statements. If it was not the United State’s place to call for Saleh’s
removal, why was it for Mubarak’s? If the United States’ emphasis on a quick
democratic transition begins to appear during the discussion of how long it took for
official calls for a foreign leader’s ouster to emerge from the White House, it becomes
striking when contrasting the U.S.’ reaction to delays in country’s transition schedules.

Reactions to Delays in Transition Schedules
Take, for instance, Yemen’s National Dialogue, which started on March 18th
2013. It was intended to last six months, and it concluded, not in September 2013 as
scheduled, but January 2014 without a division of north-south federal regions, and
Interim President Hadi’s term was extended by another year. That’s a five-month delay in
Yemen’s schedule, yet on December 3rd, 2013, when a journalist asked if the speaker had
an update on Yemen’s progress, speaker Harf’s response was “I don’t have an update on
where their national dialogue is… I’ll check with our team and see. Maybe tomorrow, if I
do, I can share it”. This herculean project had been set back by four months at this point,
yet the United States didn’t have an update on its progress.
There is also the example of the election delays in Tunisia. On the 26th of May
2011, it was brought up in the press briefings that the Tunisian electoral commission
wished to push back elections slated for July, to October due to “technical problems”.
The spokesperson’s reaction to this three-month delay was, “I think we’re sympathetic
with the challenges that they face trying to move towards democratic elections in such a
short period after such a long time of autocratic rule. That said, too long a delay would be
of concern. But I think we’re, again, supportive and sympathetic to the realities that they
face”. When asked whether three months was too much of a delay, Mr. Toner responded
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“I don’t want to put a timeline on it, but I think that our feeling is that if they need more
time to ensure free and fair and transparent elections that that’s okay”. The overall theme
of the speaker’s response was laid back, and though it did express a desire for the
Tunisian democratization process to progress, it emphasized the importance of change
occurring on the Tunisian’s own time.
These words are in almost direct conflict with the message communicated in
reaction to a potential delay of Egypt’s November 28th 2011 elections. On October 11th
2011, spokesperson Nuland conveyed the United States’ dismay over an increase in
violence that occurred on the 9th. Human Rights Watch has stated that the main victims of
the violence perpetrated by the Egyptian military were unarmed Coptic Christian
demonstrators (Human Rights Watch, Egypt, October 2011), but this description of the
protestors was not mentioned by the speaker. Instead, when confronted with questions
about the violence that had occurred, Nuland stated the importance of continuing on
Egypt’s current path,
The Secretary is expecting to be in contact with Foreign Minister Amr
again sometime today to again stress the importance of digging in and
continuing on the transition course. This can’t be an excuse for slowing
down because what we’re seeing here are pent-up aspirations, pent-up
concerns within the Egyptian population, and we need a complete
transition to a democratic system that protects everybody’s rights.
It was worrying that attacks on the Copts, a minority group that often faces violence in
Egypt, were not reason enough to at least consider the notion of suspending voting. As
the parliamentary elections drew closer, protestors became more agitated. On the 20th of
November, twelve people were killed in another bout of violence (Elyan & Blair, 2011),
and in each subsequent day leading up to the elections, the speaker made it a point to
stress the importance of keeping to the 28th date. When a journalist asked why the United
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States was behaving as if the events of the past 72 hours hadn’t occurred, as if “you don’t
have people claiming their relatives’ bodies from the morgue and people out in the
middle of the night chanting we want the military to step down, we want them to leave
power”, the spokesperson simply reiterated that the events of the past weekend were
“deplorable”, and that the United States wanted to see all parties involved “focusing their
energies on getting to a good first round of elections on the 28th of November. That’s
what the Egyptian people deserve, and that’s what they ought to have”.
The Tunisian, Yemeni, and Egyptian narratives strike completely different chords.
When Tunisia suggests a three-month delay due solely to the transitional government’s
desire, and not as a reaction to violence, the United States is completely complicit. When
Yemen’s national dialogue is set back by five months, the speaker often doesn’t have an
update. But when the mere possibility of a delay in Egypt’s 2011 parliamentary elections
is brought up, the United States fervently opposes the suggestion and insists that the
elections be held on the exact day they had been set for, despite violence against Copts
and protestors. This position seems to be at odds with the oft-stated belief that the United
State’s “support for democratic transitions is predicated wherever they are on [the]
strongest possible human rights standards, respect for citizens et cetera” (Victoria
Nuland, press briefing 2/6/13). It raises the question of how a democracy is to be
successful when it’s founded on the suppression of minorities and the restriction of civil
liberties, and Egypt has been facing much of this sort of repression since Morsi’s ouster.
In comparing the rhetoric focused on Egypt with that on Tunisia, Libya and
Yemen, it is clear that the rhetorical pressure on Egypt to democratize is atypical. The
United States places an undue amount of stress on the importance of a quick democratic
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transition in Egypt with its repeated insistence on a rapid process, and its strong
responses to any delays in the transition’s time schedule, reactions that are not invoked
when similar instances occur in any of the other three countries.
Yemen, in spite of, or, as some might argue, due to, its five-month delay, has
made some of the most significant strides towards democracy of any of the four
countries, as BBC reporter Danya Greenfield puts it, “Yemenis should be proud that they
managed a genuinely inclusive dialogue process with 565 delegates representing
established political parties, newly emergent political movements, youth activists, women
leaders, and civil society organisations” (Greenfield, 2014). To be sure, Yemen still has
significant strides to make before achieving a true, consolidated democracy, but it is on
much surer footing than Egypt currently is. Egypt has been experiencing a consistant
decline in civil liberties since the July 3rd coup , but instead of taking the time to address
the increasing concerns, it is still speeding towards presidential elections set for July
2014.
Egypt’s Civil Liberties Since July 3rd 2013
In response to the heightened violence and political turmoil since Morsi’s ouster,
Freedom House developed the “Egypt Democracy Compass”, which consists of monthly
updates on Egypt’s progress in eight fields they deem necessary for the consolidation of a
liberal democracy: Constitution, Elections, Political Participation, Media Freedom and
Freedom of Expression, Civilian Control and Security-Sector Reform, Peaceful
Assembly and Civic Activism, and Judicial Independence and Rule of Law. Below is a
visual representation, created for the purposes of this paper, of Freedom House’s
assessment of Egypt’s progress since July of 2013. Boxes with a (+), and highlighted in
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yellow indicate that progress occurred in this field during that particular month. Those
boxes labeled with a (-), and highlighted in red, signify that actions occurred during the
month that detract from the previous month’s status. Anything with a (=), and without
any highlight, means that there was no change during that month from last month’s
standing.

On the whole, Egypt has been experiencing a consistent restriction in
Figure 8: Freedom House’s Assessment of Progress of Civil Liberties in Egypt
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civil liberties since the July 3rd coup. Following Morsi’s ouster, the constitution was
suspended and Adli Mansour, the chairman of the Supreme Constitutional Court, became
the interim president. Despite the supposed “civilian nature” of the new government,
Mansour did not state that the source of his legitimacy was the Egyptian people, as Morsi
did during his 2012 acceptance, but instead cited the head of the armed forces, Abdel
Fattah al-Sisi’s, July 3rd declaration as the basis of his authority (Freedom House, 2013a).
Mansour announced a plan for the drafting of a new constitution during his July 8th
Consitutional Declaration. He stated that it was to be drafted by a small panel of jursits,
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and then revised by a committee he described in his, as a “50- member committee
representing all categories of society and demographic diversities especially parties,
intellectuals, workers, peasants, members of trade unions and qualitative unions, national
councils, Al Azhar, churches, the Armed Forces, the Police and public figures including
ten members from the youth and women at least ”.
Yet, the fifty-member committee did not live up to these guidelines. It included
only five women, four Copts, and two Islamist members, one of whom walked out of the
committee’s proceedings in September claiming that the group was “not inclusive of all
political perspectives” (Freedom House, 2013b). The committee would later draw further
complaints due to the compromise of their transparency in October when they chose to
conduct secret votes.
The constitutional committee is far from being the only thing to attract criticism
from the Egyptian public since the July 3rd coup. Egypt saw in increase in violence since
Morsi’s removal, which left “virtually no space for constructive public debate or other
normal pre-election activities” (Freedom House, 2014a). The Muslim Brotherhood was
once again banned from politics with its new classification as a terrorist organization,
Imams were prevented from delivering services, people who were not supportive of the
new government, like Comedian Bassem Youssef, or the four journalists from Al-Jazeera
English who were arrested in December, were quieted, the Military was not held
accountable for the deaths of over 1,000 civilians during summer protests, and the draft
constitution, which was adopted by 98.1 percent of the votes cast on the January 14th-15th
2014 referendum, granted even more power and autonomy to the military, and allows for
military trials of civilians.
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On the whole, only two of the eight categories outlined by Freedom House have
experienced any sort of progress, and these steps have been limited at best. The
remaining categories have born witness to either the increasing restriction of civilian
rights in Egypt or stagnation under Mansour’s, and, indirectly, Sisi’s, rule.
The drafting of a new constitution saw the most progress of any of the eight areas.
By January 2013 a new constitution had been passed by 98.1 percent, with 38.6 of all
eligible voters participating. One factor of note about the constitutional referendum,
however, was that it featured a “heavy, government-backed campaign for a ‘yes’ vote,
and an effective ban on any advocacy for a ‘no’ vote” (Freedom House, 2014b). The new
constitution featured some small improvements in civil liberties such as the protection of
women’s rights, freedom of expression, but it also granted more power and autonomy to
the military and allows for civilians to be put on trial. It is yet to be seen if the new rights
instilled in this constitution will be protected, as authorities still crack down on the
freedom of expression and other civil liberties (Freedom House, 2014b).
Elections saw the restraints of several civil liberties, such as the political violence
that has wracked Egypt since July and how it has left almost no space for pre-election
democratic activities (Dunne & Williamson, 2014). Another worrying factor was the
decision made by Mansour that presidential elections would be held before parliamentary
elections, which leaves the potential for Egypt to fall easily back into the military
dominated politics the people revolted against in 2011.
On the subject of political participation, considerable restraints have occurred.
The Muslim Brotherhood’s political branch, the Freedom and Justice Party, were labeled
as a terrorist organization, and harsh penalties were imposed on membership or
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association. Many of its leaders, like Morsi himself, or Gehad el-Haddad, the Muslim
Brotherhood’s spokesperson, have been arrested. Even public figures who have no
association to the Muslim Brotherhood, but have questioned the actions of the
government, like renowned political scientist Emad Shahin, Amr Hamazawy, and
activists, Ahmed Maher, Mohamed Adel, and Ahmed Douma, have been arrested. Upon
the announcement of the verdict of the three activists, who were charged with holding an
“unauthorized protest”, the courtroom supposedly erupted into chants of, "Down, down
with military rule! We are in a state, not in a military camp" (Guerin, 2013).
The Egyptian government has also sought to control the media during this past
year. Upon Morsi’s ouster, the new government raided Egyptian Al-Jazeera, which
purportedly has a pro-Morsi bias, and arrested several staff members, including Ayman
Gaballah, Mubasher Misr's (one of Al Jazeera’s TV channels) managing director. Three
other TV channels were also shut down during this time, which provoked statements like
“We are concerned by reports that authorities are shutting down television coverage
based on political perspective," from Sherif Mansour of the New York-based Committee
to Protect Journalists, and was deemed a "blow to freedom of expression" by Amnesty
International (Al Jazeera, 2013).
In September the government shut down more television channels, some of which
broadcasted pro-Morsi views, and police raided the Cairo office of Turkish public
broadcaster. In October Mostada Diab, who had been covering protests in Ismailia, and
Mohamed Dayan, a Syrian photojournalist were arrested, and on November 1st, the
comedian Bassem Youssef’s popular TV show, which is often referred to as the Egyptian
equivalent of Jon Stewart’s “The Daily Show”, was suspended after it had made fun of
the military regime (BBC News, 2013a). The police also arrested four Al-Jazeera
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English journalists on December 29th, claiming that they had met with a terrorist
organization (the Muslim Brotherhood) and that they were airing false news. The
journalists were held for forty-six days before being brought to court in February
(Kingsley, 2014).
The crisis in Egypt has also heightened religious divisions and led to increased
levels of violence. Coptic Christianity, a minority religion in Egypt, continues to be
targeted in armed attacks, like on October 20th when a wedding party was assaulted.
Though reports are conflicting, it is confirmed that several died in the attacks, and many
more were injured (BBC News, 2013b; Kingsley, 2013). This attack and others like it
have exacerbated Coptic fears that they will become scapegoats for the turmoil that has
wrecked Egypt since Morsi’s fall due to their support of his ouster. The government itself
has lashed out on conservative forms of Islam that could be perceived as related to the
Muslim Brotherhood, for instance, in September roughly 55,000 Imams were prevented
from delivering sermons, and on October 31st all Mosque board of directors that were
appointed “under previous regimes” were officially dissolved.
Freedom House notes that since the coup, the military has played “an assertive
role in the political processes”. On the 26th of July of 2013 al-Sisi called upon Egyptians
to support the army’s efforts to “confront violence and terrorism”, a veiled reference to
Morsi supporters who had been demonstrating since his ouster. In August, over 700
protestors were killed by the military and the government declared a state of emergency,
much like the thirty-year state of emergency that lasted throughout Mubarak’s term, in
order to give security forces greater flexibility in dealing with protestors (article). By
September, over 1,000 protestors had been killed since the July 3rd coup and the military
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continued to act with impunity as the government issued a two-month extension of the
state of emergency.
Despite warnings from the international community garnered from the mass
killings of over 1,000 protestors since the coup, security forces killed more than fifty
antigovernment protestors in October and a ban was placed on all political activities at
universities. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace has mapped out below the
distribution of politically related deaths in Egypt between the July 3rd coup and January
31, 2014. Within this timeframe, more than 2,588 people died as a result of political
clashes, 2,528 of these people were simply trying to exercise their democratic right to
protest their country’s current political state.

On November 24th, interim president Mansour signed a law that gave police broad
discretion to ban and forcibly disperse gatherings of ten people or more, prohibit protests
at all places of worship, and require protest organizers to notify police of their intentions
at least three days ahead of time (Freedom House, 2014b). Protests in reaction to this new
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law occurred on the 26th and 27th, and resulted in the arrest of dozens of activists and the
sentencing of twenty-one female Islamic protestors of eleven years in jail on charges
related to an October demonstration (Amnesty International News, 2013). On December
18th security forces raided the office of the Egyptian Center for Economic and Social
Rights and arrested several members, and on the third anniversary of the revolution,
authorities cracked down on protests against the government with tear gas and live
ammunition which resulted in at least forty-nine deaths and the arrest of over 1,000
protestors. As the head of the Armed Forces, General al-Sisi was, either directly or
indirectly, supervising these actions. Now al-Sisi has declared he’s hanging up his
military garb in favor of a new occupancy, the presidency.
On March 23rd, 2014, Abdel Fatah al-Sisi, the same al-Sisi who headed the July
3rd coup, who was in charge of the military when it killed over 1,000 Egyptian protestors,
and squashed down on the political opponents of the government, declared he was
renouncing his title as Egyptian military chief and officially running for presidency. He
will, by most estimates, be successful, as al-Sisi “is almost universally expected to win
the election and thus formalize the de facto power he currently holds. He has been the
government’s pre-eminent decision maker since he led the ouster of Egypt’s first freely
elected leader” (Kirkpatrick, 2014). During his announcement of candidacy, al-Sisi said
several troubling things, one of them being, “It is true this is my last day in uniform but I
will fight every day for Egypt free of fear and terror… I repeat what I have said before:
‘We’d rather die before Egyptians are terrorized”. This is not the first time al-Sisi has
used the word “terrorism”, he’s used it many times before and in each instance he was
referring to the Muslim Brotherhood, which was, after Mubarak’s fall until the July 3rd
coup, considered to be a completely legitimate political party.
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Al-Sisi also stated he would soon be presenting “a clear platform for a modern
and democratic Egypt”, but what democracy is there to be had when civilians are afraid
of talking, are frequently censored, and attacked when they protest? Many are skeptical
of his ability to bring about democracy in Egypt. Leaders of the pro-democracy National
Alliance for the Defense of Legitimacy have publically condemned his candidacy and
stated that it only means that Morsi’s ouster was indeed a coup. Alaa Abul-Nasr, a senior
leader of the Construction and Development Party, stated that "Al-Sisi's resignation will
not exonerate him from blame for the bloodshed he caused or stop the relatives of the
victims from demanding justice”, and argued that supporters of Morsi's ouster were
supporting a "fascist military coup that killed thousands of people and now seeks to take
power". Emam Youssef, senior member of the Salafist Asala Party, commented that alSisi's candidacy was just another part of the "usurping" of the constitutional legitimacy, a
process which "… included the ouster of the elected president, dissolving the elected
parliament and killing and detaining thousands of people" (Turkish Press, 2014). The
only other option for this future election so far is Leftist presidential candidate Hamdeen
Sabahi, who came in third place during the 2012 elections, and has expressed doubts that
al-Sisi could bring about a democracy in Egypt. Sabahi argues that actions taken by alSisi since the coup "makes him bear a direct or indirect political responsibility for a list of
rights violations" and stated that "The regime that ruled us for decades based on
repression and corruption still exists”, as the “… current transitional system did not
respect the values of democracy and plurality, and violated the constitution ... in the way
it dealt with its opponents" (Saleh & Georgy, 2014). Egypt’s current path seems
hazardous for the progress of democracy.
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Since the July 3rd coup Egypt has not been an environment conducive to
democratic progress. As elections draw near, public support for al-Sisi’s presidential
candidacy is high, which increases the likelihood that the “military [will] remain
politically dominant and resistant to accountability for human rights abuses” (Martini &
Taylor, 2011). The military has been operating without any civilian oversight and is
actively quashing down on civil protestors. The evidence clearly indicates that, “Egypt is
a far more violent and unstable place than it was before July 2013 or indeed has been for
decades, as government repression drives an expanding cycle of political violence. And
there has been no indication yet that conditions will quiet down anytime soon” (Dunne &
Williamson, 2014).
With harsh military surveillance, the implementation of censorship and the lack of
time and space for political participation, it seems almost ridiculous that elections are fast
approaching, and yet the United States is still applying rhetorical pressure on Egypt to
democratize quickly. During the seven-month period between July 2013 and January
2014, twenty-four distinct utterances were released by a State Department spokesperson
urging speed. Though the utterances have tapered off in recent months, this number is
still higher than the average amount of utterances per seven-month period since the
revolution in 2011, which is nineteen utterances. Even the conditionalities set by the
United States on Egyptian aid are urging for a faster process.

United States’ Conditionalities On Aid To Egypt
The FY2014 omnibus bill includes two democratic conditionalities. The first
installment of $975 million dollars is to be provided when the Secretary of State certifies
that Egypt has held a constitutional referendum and is taking steps to support a

38

democratic transition in Egypt. The remaining $576 million is conditional on the
Secretary’s certification that parliamentary and presidential elections have been held and
that the new government is taking steps to govern democratically. Two things are of
specific note concerning these conditionalities. The first being that they are inherently
time sensitive. The United States is saying that Egypt will not receive its aid until these
steps have been taken; it is essentially telling Egypt to move faster if it wants these sums.
The sway that this aid has in altering Egyptian political behavior can be contested, but the
fact remains that the United States’ conditionality was rooted in time, and not, in
liberalization reform, which is the second issue of note.
The United States has born witness to the restriction of civil liberties that has
occurred since the July 3rd coup, and the abuses civilians have felt at the hands of security
forces, and yet the conditionalities are so broad that they do almost nothing to remedy
these issues. As O’Donnell and Schmitter and many others have noted, democratization
can occur without liberalization and elections are not the end-all in democratic
consolidations (O'Donnell & Schmitter, 1986). The United States does not condition its
aid on the progress of civil liberties like so many in the literature suggest they do. There
is no stipulation for a reduced amount of censorship, for less military oversight or more
freedom of political expression. Instead the terms are broad and easily achievable,
because any insistence on the expansion of civil liberties would come into direct conflict
with the Egyptian military, and because the United States has chosen between the goals
outlined by Jeremy Sharp in his congressional report and U.S. national and global
security is more important than the promotion of democracy in Egypt. By insisting upon
a rapid transition, which doesn’t allow for the fostering of new political parties or the
establishment of increased civil liberties, and by setting the bar for achievement of
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conditionalities so low, the United States is maintaining the appearance of democracy
promotion while practically only supporting the insurrection of an illiberal democracy in
Egypt and the eventual return to military power.

CONCLUSION
Democracy takes time. It is not always a process that can occur within several
decades, much less several years. The democratization literature, along with countless
case studies, confirms this fact. And while history shows us that external democracy
promotion can be successful, it must be based on consideration for each country’s
specific needs, focused on the promotion of civil liberties, and supplanted by democracy
promotion methods, like conditionalities, that are applied with sufficient intent and are
rigorous enough in their demands. The United States has been a vocal supporter of
Egypt’s democratization since the blooms of its revolution on February 25th 2011, but the
U.S.’ actions have not been conducive to proper support of an Egyptian democracy. This
dichotomy is due in part to the inherent conflict the United States faces when dealing
with democratizing countries of national security importance. The United States cannot
afford the blows that would be dealt to its reputation if it were to choose not to support a
democratic transition, especially one occurring within the borders of a major ally, but it
also places more importance on the role Egypt plays in its relations with other Arab
nations. When these two realities conflicted, the United States chose to push for a rapid
democratization process in Egypt, so that they would still appear to be supportive, but
they could, theoretically, return sooner to dealing with issues critical to American
national security.
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The U.S. has pushed for a rapid democratization process in Egypt, through both
its rhetoric, and its poorly crafted aid conditionalities, which were either swept aside
when convenient, or set at a height so easily attainable, and with no reference to civil
liberties, that Egypt will not be challenged to achieve them. Since the July 3rd coup, Egypt
has faced systematic degradations in their democratic and political rights. They cannot
speak freely for fear of being censored, nor can they protest without fear of assault or
arrest. And yet the United States, which has rallied so passionately for democratic
progress in Egypt, has stood aside, its only punitive measure being the temporary freeze
of an insignificant amount of military aid in October of 2013. The United States could
have had a positive effect on Egypt’s transition had it chosen to support the bolstering of
Egyptian civil liberties. But it instead chose speed over the deliberation that worked so
well in countries like Yemen. Egypt is now racing towards a presidential election born of
an undemocratic environment that will likely be won by an ex-military officer. The
situation at hand sounds remarkably like Egypt under Mubarak’s regime. With every act
of censorship that goes without condemnation, with every day that the Egyptian military
continues to act with impunity, it seems ever more likely that the United States will stand
by as the echoes of the January 25th revolution are silenced.
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APPENDIX

EGYPT
1/31/11
Crowley
1.
2.

So we will be looking for concrete actions, a process that leads Egypt to a
more inclusive environment, and free, fair, and credible elections later this year.
And our private message is our public message, that the government has to
respond to the aspirations of the Egyptian people. So this will take some time to
undertake, but we do encourage Egypt to take aggressive steps as soon as
possible.

2/2/11
Crowley
1.

She [Clinton] strongly encouraged the government to investigate and hold those
responsible for the violence accountable. And she continued to stress to Vice
President Suleiman that the transition has to start now.
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2.
3.

4.

5.

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

As the President said last night, there needs to be a transition; it needs to start
now
…a clear process that the people of Egypt can see that all parties who want to
shape Egypt’s future are taking specific actions leading to elections and a new
government as soon as possible.
But now is the time where the government has to take meaningful, serious steps,
concrete steps, to demonstrate that it is moving down a path to elections and to
democratic governance – the governance in Egypt that responds to the
aspirations of the Egyptian people.
And it is imperative that this process begin now and that it can begin with
bringing together this national dialogue, bringing together opposition figures,
members of civil society, along with institutions like the army, along with key
officials.
The people need to see that transition in action now.
We are encouraging the government to move farther and faster.
It’s now time for the Egyptian Government to demonstrate that it is taking
aggressive steps to respond to what the people are demanding.
We believe that more needs to be done. We believe that more needs to be done
faster.
So if the foreign minister is saying, in essence, mañana, we’re saying that’s not
good enough.
Our message to Egypt, publicly and privately, is that the transition needs to start
now.
It can’t be delayed.
It can’t be delayed until there’s a perfect set of circumstances.
The transition has to start now.
The transition needs to start now. Where that transition leads is up to Egyptian
leaders and up to the Egyptian people.
The sooner that this kind of serious conversation among broad elements of
Egyptian society occurs, then that can give the Egyptian people confidence that
not only have their voices been heard
Our point is this transition, this process to fundamental change needs to begin
now.
There has to be change, it has to start now
And they’ve seen some steps, and our view is that more needs to be done and
more needs to be done faster.

2/3/11
Crowley
1.

2.
3.

…it’s vitally important for the government to reach out to representatives of
Egypt’s opposition and begin serious negotiations. That, we think, is a very clear
imperative and something that needs to be done now so that the Egyptian people
can see that there is a credible transition process underway.
Well, again, we want to see a transition now.
We want to see a credible process where the government, the opposition, other
key elements of Egyptian society, they come together as part of a broad-based
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4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

12.
13.

effort to review what needs to be done and to take specific actions and do so
with urgency.
And we – President Mubarak has made public commitments to undertake a
process of reform and change, and we are just encouraging him, ‘You have no
time to waste’
This is why we continue to encourage the government and the opposition come
together, come together now, have a broad-based effort, move forward so that
people can see that change is coming and, in fact, that change is occurring.
We want to see an early transition to free, fair, and credible elections.
But our concern is that the government has to move farther and faster than it
has to date.
…the sooner this process starts, the better
It needs to start now so that you can have a broad-based effort, you can bring in
a wide range of opposition figures.
And that’s why we need to have a process it needs to be an open, broad-based
process, and it needs to start right away.
…the sooner these elections can be held – and understand, one of the challenges
for Egypt will be what are they going to do, not only about the presidential
elections, what are they going to do about parliament. There are lots of decisions
to be made, but the sooner that they demonstrate progress to the Egyptian people,
that the better.
Time is of essence
As we’ve stressed, as Robert Gibbs and I both stressed yesterday, this process
needs to begin now.

2/7/11
Crowley
1.
2.

3.
4.

They need to seize this opportunity.
They need to test the seriousness of the government and others that they will
participate in a peaceful democratic process. The sooner this can happen, the
better.
No, I think we want to see this move expeditiously, as the Secretary stressed in
her various interviews yesterday.
It’s not for us to dictate what happens in Egypt. But this has to be a real process. I
mean, we do have a sense of urgency, not so much in the timeline as in where
this process is actually seen as credible and seen as delivering change as the
people of Egypt have embraced.

2/16/11
Crowley
1.
2.

No, we want – the sooner this can happen, the better.
The sooner it can happen, the better.

7/13/11
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Toner
1.
2.
3.

We recognize that Egypt is navigating a difficult period as they head towards
elections. It’s important that those elections stay on track
…but it’s important that they remain on track.
Again, we’re aware that there’s significant challenges here and there’s a
time squeeze…

10/11/11
Nuland
1.

The Secretary is expecting to be in contact with Foreign Minister Amr again
sometime today to again stress the importance of digging in and continuing
on the transition course.

2.

This can’t be an excuse for slowing down because what we’re seeing here
are pent-up aspirations, pent-up concerns within the Egyptian population, and we
need a complete transition to a democratic system that protects everybody’s
rights.
…our view has been that the emergency law should be lifted and should be
lifted as soon as possible.
our view is that we need to stick to the transition on time
…as fully and quickly as possible because we’ve got a lot of pent-up feelings
here.

3.
4.
5.

11/3/11
Nuland
1.

We also, as you know, believe that Egypt’s emergency law should be lifted
immediately.

11/18/11
Toner
1.

…as committed itself to carrying out a transition to free and fair election of a
civilian-led government. And we believe that should take place and should
take place in a timely manner.

11/21/11
Nuland
1.
2.

In the coming days, it will be very important for all parties to focus on
holding free, fair, and peaceful elections as scheduled on November 28th.
What we are focused on, as I said, is helping and hoping that the Egyptian
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3.

4.

5.

people can start this electoral process on time in a free, fair, and peaceful manner
on the 28th of November.
We want to see a clear transition timetable, but again, the plan now is to
have these rounds of parliamentary elections to elect a body that can begin
then laying out of the rest of the timetable, including for the drafting of the
constitution and including for the decisions on head of state and government.
What we want to see after these deplorable incidents over the weekend is all
parties – ruling party, all of the folks in the Egyptian public, all of the parties –
focusing their energies on getting to a good first round of elections on the 28th of
November.
Again, we need to see a free, fair, and transparent election on the 28th. And
that’s what will be a first step in demonstrating that not only governing
authorities but all parties involved are sticking to the democratic roadmap, and
that it has integrity going forward.

11/22/11
Nuland
1.

2.
3.

The first thing that he said was that the Egyptian Government will ensure
that the elections begin on time. That’s something that we have been calling
for, as I did here yesterday, as we have throughout the government.
…handing back of power to civilians will be completed before July 2012. So
we consider that these were important reassurances, reassurances that we have
also wanted.
We have wanted that to proceed peacefully, we have wanted that to proceed
transparently and quickly.

11/23/11
Toner
1.
2.

We also believe that it’s important that the SCAF ensure that free and fair
elections proceed expeditiously
and that this newly appointed civilian government be able to exercise real
executive power immediately.

12/7/11
Toner
1.

And so we believe that that’s a credible, doable timeline, and we should stick
to it – or that they should stick to it.

12/9/11
Nuland
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1.

We have not changed our position one iota. We want to see a democratic
transition happen in Egypt as peacefully, as openly, as fairly, and as quickly as
possible.

1/25/12
Nuland
1.

We’re talking, we hope, about a relatively short period of time – period of time
now from the end of January until June, when we hope that all these democratic
processes can be completed and that the SCAF can meet its commitment – we –
our expectation that it will meet its commitment to hand over power fully to new
authorities.

3/1/12
Nuland
1.

From our perspective, whatever is most expeditious is something that we will
support.

3/5/12
Nuland
1.

And we also have concerns about the Egyptians economy and the importance of
ensuring that this democratic transition is also accompanied by increasing
economic opportunity for the Egyptian people, and that speaks to the
conversation that the Egyptian Government is conducting now with the IMF.So
we’re calling on both sides, the government and the IMF, to do what they can to
speed up those discussions so that Egypt can have the support that it badly
needs in this period.

4/16/12
Toner
1.

Again, our interest is only seeing that this process move forward towards
presidential elections in June in a way that’s perceived by the Egyptian people
as free and fair and democratic.

4/17/12
Toner
1.

Our concern is that we want to see a fair and transparent process moving forward
and a successful handover election and handover of power to a civilian
government along the timeframe that the SCAF has already laid out. So they’ve
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already had successful parliamentary elections. We want to see that trend
continue, and leading to a transfer of power.
5/4/12
Toner
1.

I think you saw the SCAF issued a statement or came out with a statement
yesterday, where they talked about commitment to that timeline that results –
would result in a July – a June election and then a July transfer of power. So
that’s certainly encouraging.

5/31/12
Toner
1.

That’s what I was told before coming down here. But certainly it’s something
that we’ve repeatedly encouraged them to do and it’s certainly in keeping with
the timeline that the SCAF has set out for this democratic transition. So it would
be another step in that direction.

6/15/12
Nuland
1.
2.
3.

4.
5.
6.
7.

But if in fact the conclusion is that there need to be new parliamentary elections,
our hope is that they could happen swiftly and that they reflect the will of the
Egyptian people.
The SCAF has pledged to step down, turn over power to the elected leader on
July 1st, and we expect them to meet that commitment to the Egyptian people.
The court has called for new elections. If, in fact, that’s the direction that Egypt
goes, they need to be swift, they need to be fully democratic, free, transparent, so
that we can move on to giving the Egyptian people what they want, which is an
elected president and an elected parliament and a system that is permanent and
sustainable.
The remedy here, if it is to be a new election, is for that election to happen
swiftly and for the Egyptian people to have full confidence in it.
But if, in fact, the conclusion is that this set of parliamentary elections has to be
rerun, we want that done as quickly as possible.
…we don’t want it to hold up the turning over of power by the SCAF to elected
Egyptians.
We were very pleased when they made their commitment that they would step
down and turn over power on July 1st

6/18/12
Nuland
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1.
2.
3.
4.

We’re particularly concerned by decisions that appear to prolong the military’s
hold on power.
…the timely seating of a democratically elected parliament
…the swift, permanent transfer of power to a civilian government.
Q: Yeah, okay. So on Egypt, you don’t take any heart at all in the fact that they
said that the generals say they’re going to turn over power to the president on the
30th?
A: Well, they’ve made a commitment to their – to the Egyptian people, and we
want to see them meet it.

5.
6.
7.
8.

What we want to see is a democratically elected president, a democratically
elected parliament, a constitution that reflects the will of the Egyptian people,
and a full transfer of power back to civilian rule as quickly as possible.
So this is why we are laying down these clear markers now – that the SCAF has
made a commitment to allow a transfer of democratic power, and we want to see
them meet those commitments.
So this is for the Egyptians now to decide, but we want to see it decided in a
swift, transparent, democratic way that allows a full transfer of power and gets
the Egyptian people what they want, which is civilian democratic rule
The military has made a commitment to the Egyptian people that they would be
good stewards during this period of a democratic transition process. They need to
now complete that process and they need to complete it swiftly and give all of
us, starting with their own people, confidence.

6/20/12
Nuland
1.

Well, again, I spoke to this two days ago, and we expressed concerns about some
of these moves that appear to prolong the period that the SCAF remains a
political actor on the scene

6/21/12
Nuland
1.

We expect that Egyptian authorities are going to move as quickly as they can to
announce the election results so that the election – so that the Egyptian people
can have confidence in the outcome and can move forward with their democratic
transition because, as we’ve said here yesterday, there are all these other
elements that also have to be dealt with.

6/22/12
Nuland
1.

The constitutional assembly needing to be fully representative of all of the views
and colors of Egyptian society and Egyptian political life, and then getting to a
democratically elected and seated parliament as quickly as possible.
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7/10/12
Ventrell
1.
2.

We are fully committed to this transition continuing on course.
Broadly speaking, our framework is going to be how do we keep this transition
on track.

12/6/12
Toner
1.

It’s obvious that Egyptians have strong opinions regarding recent actions as well
as the substance of the draft constitution, and we obviously need to see a
dialogue in place as soon as possible to address their concerns.

7/16/13
Ventrell
1.

Again, first of all, as we’ve said, the transitional – we’ve called on the
transitional government to move toward a democratically elected civilian
government as quickly as possible, and it needs to be inclusive.

7/17/13
Harf
1&2.

He did make some brief comments in his remarks today about Egypt,
underscoring the same themes we’ve been underscoring from this podium, that
we want Egypt to very quickly – as quickly as possible – move back to a
sustainable, inclusive, democratic process. He mentioned that briefly as well, but
again, the subject wasn’t – was not Egypt.

7/19/13
Harf
1.
2.
3.
4.

We are working with the interim government because they are the ones who are
tasked with quickly getting us back to a democratic process.
…we’re working with the interim government because they’re the ones who can
do this most quickly, of course.
So what we’re focused on now is working with the interim government and
pushing them to quickly return to a stable, sustainable – excuse me –
inclusive democracy.
So going forward, we remain concerned about polarization. That’s why we’re
encouraging a return quickly to an inclusive process that gets us back to
sustainable democracy.
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7/23/13
Psaki
1.

We are – we – everything we do is focused on hastening Egypt’s return to a
democratically elected government. That’s where our focus is.

7/25/13
Harf
1.
2.

3.

Well, we’ve repeatedly been clear that our support for a transition to be
inclusive, a democratically elected civilian government needs to return to
Egypt as soon as possible. That has not changed in any way.
We’ve said this needs to be inclusive going forward repeatedly. That has not
changed, so while we’ve seen some steps, they need to continue the process,
and as soon as possible, get back to a democratically elected, sustainable
democracy for their government.
…that we are continuing to push the Egyptian Government, the interim
government, to return quickly to a democratically-elected civilian
government.

7/26/13
Psaki
1.

So we will work with Congress to determine how best to continue assistance to
Egypt in a manner that encourages Egypt’s interim government to quickly and
responsibly transition back to a stable, democratic, civilian-led, and inclusive
government.

7/29/13
Psaki
1.

…with the goal in mind that our focus is encouraging Egyptians to take steps to
enable the interim government to quickly and responsibly transition back to a
stable, democratic, civilian, inclusive government.

8/7/13
Psaki
1.

These decisions, of course, will only be made by Egyptians for Egyptians. We
certainly hope that they will make them soon.

8/8/13
Psaki
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1.

Egyptian Government and opposition parties to begin a process of genuine
reconciliation and move ahead inclusively to consider amendments to the
constitution, and prepare as quickly as possible for parliamentary and
presidential elections.

8/14/13
Psaki
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

…that we would like to happen as quickly as possible
Immediately
Immediately
As soon as possible.
Immediately
As soon as possible.
As soon as possible.

8/15/13
Psaki
1.

It should be lifted immediately.

9/12/13
Harf
1.

Well, we remain opposed, as we have from the beginning, to the state of
emergency. And we urge the interim government to end it immediately, to
create an atmosphere where Egyptians on all sides can peacefully exercise their
right to freedom of assembly and expression.

TUNISIA
1/13/11
Crowley
1.
2.

And we hope the sooner they act on these concerns the better.
And we hope that the government will respond aggressively to the concerns of
its citizens.

1/24/11
Crowley

56

1.

…works to achieve transparent, credible, and timely elections; as well as its
government addressing the underlying political and economic grievances that
led to the recent unrest.

2/7/13
Nuland
1.
2.

But we also encourage Tunisia’s citizens, their political leaders, to continue to
work together to find consensus so that the constitution can be completed
quickly, to ensure that that constitution respects universal human rights
…that they can develop a plan for early elections and determine a permanent
government.

12/16/13
Harf
1.

We look forward to the installation of a new government, of effective and
competent ministers to lead the country until early elections can be organized.

1/27/14
Psaki
1.

We look forward to further steps in the democratic transition – in particular, the
swearing-in of a new, independent government and setting a date for early
elections so that Tunisian citizens can choose their new leaders and determine
the country’s future.

LIBYA
10/20/11
Toner
1.
2.
3.

The President spoke about the need for them to move quickly both in the
formation of an interim government,
…there’s still a very strong sense of urgency
TNC needs to move forward as quickly as possible both to establish, as I said,
that unified control over the military; to establish control throughout the
country; to, as I said, set up that transitional – or that interim government; and
then to move towards elections.
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YEMEN
4/5/11
Toner
1.

I think we do believe it should be done quickly. Obviously, there’s ongoing
concerns by the protestors and they need to be addressed.

6/3/11
Toner
1.

And so we, again, call on President Saleh to move immediately to heed the
calls of the Yemeni people.

6/6/11
Toner
1.
2.
3.

…what we think is important is that the government that is in place, the civilian
government, act immediately to begin the democratic transition
So we believe now that the time is right for this kind of transition to take place.
…the Government of Yemen, should seize an opportunity to begin a
democratic transition that’s, frankly, overdue given the level of violence and
instability of the past several weeks.

6/7/11
Toner
1.

…we believe that the time is now to engage in a peaceful and orderly
transition, one that’s consistent with Yemen’s constitutional processes.

6/8/11
Toner
1.

There is a government that remains in place there, and they need to seize the
moment and move forward.

6/16/11
Nuland
1.

…we believe that there is no time to lose in moving on to the democratic future
that Yemen deserves.
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6/17/11
Nuland
1.

More broadly, we call for an immediate, peaceful, and orderly transition in
Yemen that allows the Yemeni people to realize their aspirations, and we
encourage all sides to engage in dialogue and peacefully move Yemen forward.

6/27/11
Nuland
1.
2.
3.

And there he reinforced the same messages that we are giving here that it’s time
for a peaceful transfer of power
…transition to begin now.
I think our messages are clear given both in Yemen, from this podium publicly,
that it’s time for him to sign the GCC agreement.

8/8/11
Toner
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

We’ve called for an immediate, peaceful, and orderly transition, and believe
that’s in the best interests of the Yemeni people.
And we’ve also said that this is something that cannot wait until a decision is
made regarding President Saleh’s future
…they need to move towards this transition immediately.
All we can do is continue to press our belief that this transition needs to happen
immediately
…cannot wait until a decision is made about his future.
What we think is a good thing is that Yemen move forward immediately on a
transition plan that meets the aspirations of the Yemeni people –
…that Yemen needs to move forward now on these kinds of reforms and on this
transition.

8/16/11
Nuland
1.

So wherever he does that from, the sooner he does it, the better it’ll be for
Yemen and the better it’ll be for stability in the region.

9/30/11
Nuland
1.

He needs to follow the roadmap put down by the GCC. He does note that
consultations are ongoing in Yemen between the opposition and government
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forces. We want to see those consultations brought to a speedy resolution to
allow a transfer of power.
10/19/11
Toner
1.
2.
3.

We would just urge that President Saleh fulfill his pledge to sign the GCC
agreement without further delay
…arrange for a presidential election to be held before the end of the year
…within the framework of that agreement.

11/15/11
Toner
1.

We believe the sooner he signs the agreement and a political transition starts,
the better, and the better for ending the violence in Yemen.

11/23/11
Toner
1.
2.

We urge all parties within Yemen to refrain from violence and to move swiftly
to implement the terms of the agreement in good faith and with transparency,
…including credible presidential elections within 90 days.

12/27/11
Toner
1.

I don’t know if it’s for us to opine whether it’s helpful or not. I think it’s for us
to reiterate a very strong message that we need to see Yemen move along in
the political transition that was outlined in the GCC.

2/21/12
Nuland
1.
2.

So over the next two years, we still need all of the following steps to be
completed.
And all of this has to be completed in two years.

5/16/12
Nuland
1.

But it is definitely meant today as a message to those who are trying to block a
transition that we have this tool to use against them and that they should think
again about the policies that they are pursuing.
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8/14/12
Nuland
1.

We are in touch with them and we have, again, called for the swift
implementation of all of these decrees so that the – so that Yemen can move on.
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